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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
ARE DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
41-22-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(2) "All-terrain type I vehicle" means any motor vehicle 52 inches or less in 
width, having an unladen dry weight of 1,500 pounds or less, traveling on three or 
more low pressure tires, having a seat designed to be straddled by the operator, and 
designed for or capable of travel over unimproved terrain. 
(3) (a) "All-terrain type II vehicle" means any other motor vehicle, not defined 
in Subsection (2), (10), or (21), designed for or capable of travel over unimproved 
terrain. 
(11) (a) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled, 
(b) "Motor vehicle" includes an off-highway vehicle. 
(12) "Off-highway vehicle" means any snowmobile, all-terrain type I vehicle, 
all-terrain type II vehicle, or motorcycle. 
(22) "Street or highway" means the entire width between boundary lines of 
every way or place of whatever nature, when any part of it is open to the use of the 
public for vehicular travel. 
41-22-10.1. Vehicles operated on posted public land. 
(1) Currently registered off-highway vehicles may be operated on public land, 
trails, streets, or highways that are posted by sign or designated by map or 
description as open to off-highway vehicle use by the controlling federal, state, 
county, or municipal agency. 
(2) The controlling federal, state, county, or municipal agency may: 
(a) provide a map or description showing or describing land, trails, streets, or 
highways open to off-highway vehicle use; or 
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(b) post signs designating lands, trails, streets, or highways open to off-highway 
vehicle use. 
(3) Liability may not be imposed on any federal, state, county, or municipality 
relating to the designation or maintenance of any land, trail, street, or highway open 
for off-highway vehicle use. 
57-14-1. Legislative purpose. 
The purpose of this act is to encourage public and private owners of land to 
make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by 
limiting the owners' liability toward persons entering the land and water areas for 
those purposes. 
57-14-2. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) (a) "Land" means any land within the territorial limits of Utah. 
(b) "Land" includes roads, railway corridors, water, water courses, private ways 
and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment when attached to the realty. 
(2) "Owner" includes the possessor of any interest in the land, whether public or 
private land, a tenant, a lessor, a lessee, and an occupant or person in control of the 
premises. 
(3) "Recreational purpose" includes, but is not limited to, any of the following or 
any combination thereof: 
(p) using off-highway vehicles or recreational vehicles; and 
(4) "Charge" means the admission price or fee asked in return for permission to 
enter or go upon the land. 
(5) "Person" includes any person, regardless of age, maturity, or experience, who 
enters upon or uses land for recreational purposes. 
57-14-3. Owner owes no duty of care or duty to give warning — Exceptions. 
Except as provided in Subsections 57-14-6(1) and (2), an owner of land owes no 
duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by any person entering or 
using the premises for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of a 
dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on those premises to that person. 
57-14-4. Owner's permitting another to use land without charge — Effect. 
Except as provided in Subsection 57-14-6(1), an owner of land who either 
directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge or for a nominal fee of not 
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more than $1 per year any person to use the land for any recreational purr *% / ; 
not thereby: 
(1) make any representation or extend any assurance that the premises are safe 
for any purpose; 
(2) confer upon the person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to w hom a 
duty of care is owed; 
(3) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person-" ~~ 
property caused by an act or omission of lie person or any other person who enters 
upon the land; or 
(4) owe any duty to cut tail the ow nei 'is use of his land (It n iiig its use foi 
recreational purposes 
RELEVANT FACTS 
The following facts were found by the District Court to be are undisputed 
and are material to the grant of Summary Judgment in this nni • 
1. Amber VK ••- . ^laimiff) was riding a Polaris ATV w hen the accident 
OCClinw ;. ' Y;;U, ,-.;_ , . ' .nplaint ]\ H" 
2. 1 • • ill iHTiinnl ii'i ,i Mai \ s ,ilc I \m ii I'uadll m 1" 
pg. jO, Amended Complaint* A f * * 
3. Marys\ ale f own has opened the road to AT V use and it functions as part ol 
an official ATV trail. (R. pg. 56; Gary James Depo. 5:3-18) 
4. 1 he land w here the accident occurred is owned aiid control i v. w uy Marys vale. 
(R. pg Ml' Aiik'iitli'tl ( 'onipl.iinl "f I !'" I 
5. The land where the accident occi irred is adjacent to the M^ -- -J 
road. (R. pg. 56; Gary James Depo. 5:4) 
; 
6. The side trail where the accident occurred was for cattle and horse access. 
(R. pgs. 57, 59; Gary James Depo. 12:20-24, 17:1-20) 
7. A sign was posted on the road where the accident occurred to allow for ATV 
use on the road. (R. pg. 56; Gary James Depo. 5:10-18) 
8. The Plaintiff ran into a barbed wire fence which had been erected near the 
road. (R. pg. 30; Amended Complaint f 8) 
9. The barbed wire fence was part of a gate located at a cattle guard in the road 
that was put in for cattle and horses to be able to go around the cattle guard. (R. 
pg. 56, 57; Gary James Depo. 6:9-23; 12:18-25) 
10. The area where the gate is located was leveled out and created as an area to 
assemble the cattle, coming off the range, and get them through the fence and past 
the cattle guard. (R. pgs. 58, 59; Gary James Depo. 16,17) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There were no material facts in dispute that would have prevented the 
District Court from granting summary judgment to Marysvale Town (hereinafter 
referred to as Town) in this matter. The facts established by the Town in support 
of its motion for summary judgment were not placed in dispute by the Plaintiff and 
those facts were sufficient for the Judge to find that the Town did not owe a duty of 
care to this Plaintiff. Even if it can be construed that the Town owed a duty to the 
Plaintiff, the Town is immunized from liability by the Limitation of Landowner 
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Liability Act il r - should not be imposed on the Town because of 
the Off-Hipfm**\ Vehicle Registration Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I THERE ARE NO FACTS IN DISPUTE THAT PREVENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR O17 ™117 TOWN. 
R iile of Ci \ il Pi ocedm e 56(e) p i o ides that when a 1:1 lotion foi sun .1 m u ] 
iiidl'iiKiiil is iii.iili1. '"(lie 'idkeise pmly nuy not irsl upon Ihr mere iilk^ntiniH 111 
denials of the pLduj ^ lm the response, by affidavits or otherwise provided 111 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." Utah R. Civ. P 56(eY A party can only put the legitimacy of a fact, 
supported by affidavits, depositions, or other sworn tesumoir, > uic >v 
present 1.. ^; i - . •• 1. or 
interrogate < - r • -• ?,: * •' -; *ah 
2005). lii^i l U l l i U X X V J - 1 U xiot submit any affidavits to counter the Town's motion 
for summary judgment. The narratives submitted to support Plaintiffs 
memorandum in opposition to summary judgment did not meet the minimum 
or dcdciralioiiN inula onlh 
Thg District Court jud^e specifically found that the facts listed in the above 
Statement of Facts had been established by the Town and were not placed in 
controversy by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff had the burden of presenting evidence 
in the form of affidavits, depositions, or interrogatories to create genuine issues of 
fact or to counter the facts established by the Town in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. The Plaintiff failed to meet this burden in her response to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The facts presented by Town had to be accepted 
as true for the purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
II. MARYSVALE TOWN HAS NO LIABILITY FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED DAMAGES BECAUSE OF THE 
LIMITATION OF LANDOWNER LIABILITY ACT. 
The Limitation of Landowner Liability - Public Recreation Act states that an 
owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by 
any person entering or using the premises for any recreational purpose or to give 
any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on those premises. 
U.C.A. § 57-14-3. Additionally, a land owner who either indirectly or directly 
invites or permits without charge any person to use the land for any recreational 
purpose does not: make any representations or extend any assurance that the 
premises are safe for any purpose. U.C.A. § 57-14-4(1). Nor does the landowner 
assume responsibility for, or incur liability, for any injury to persons or property 
caused by an act or omission of the person or any other person who enters upon the 
land. U.C.A. § 57-14-4(3). "Land" is defined as any land within the territorial 
limits of Utah, including roads. U.C.A. § 57-14-2(l)(a)-(b). "Recreational 
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Purpose" i(< rl:* = *- •'-*•* ^rr^^le using off-highway vehicles or recreational vehicles. 
U.C.A. § 57-14-2(3)(p). Off-highway vehicles include all-terrain vehicles (ATVs). 
U.C.A. § 41-22-2(12). 
The legislature passed the Act to disburden landowners of the sort of claim 
that the Plaintiff has allege cl I lie language of the i 'Vet makes it clear that 
landn iUiuis ,nn iehmal nil fun specific duties nl run Inw iiimlll unentinnal in1 \ i 
"(i) to keep their premises safe,., and (;ii) to warn of dangerous conditions.''" Young v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 876 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1994). As a result of the Act, public 
i ities who allow use of their land, for recreational purposes at. no charge have no 
*"*~ to keep then land sale or to warn of dangerous condu ions. Bcuutse there is 
no rlnty pMirn entities are not responsu <J le actions u the 
The Plaintiffs own complaint clearly establishes that the Limitation of 
Landowner Liability Act applies. The Plaintiff was riding an ATV on a road that 
runs through the town. (R pg. 30; Amended Complaint w O The area where the 
incident occurred, is property owned and controlled by the Town, thus making the 
I n w n lime Linilnv t in ill'1" p;> <() ( 'omplaml )\ I I "l,l|> I ^ \ I.ill >MI IUI I flic del iml i im 
of off-highwa> vehicle i lse so the Plaintiff was engaged, in - * ^n - r r national 
purpose." Clearly the property on which the incident took place falls within the 
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definition of land for purposes of the statute because it is within the territorial limit 
of Utah. The Plaintiffs complaint contains no allegation that the Town, as owner 
of the land, charged a fee to the Plaintiff to use the land. It is clear that the Plaintiff 
was directly or indirectly invited to use the trail or was permitted to use the trail on 
the date of the incident either because it was part of the ATV trail or a side trail. 
If the Plaintiff entered the Town's land for recreational purposes the Town 
has no liability for the injuries she incurred regardless of whether she was an 
invitee or trespasser. The legislative purpose of the Limitation of Landowner 
Liability Act is "to encourage public and private owners of land to make land and 
water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting the 
landowners' liability toward individuals entering their land." U.C.A. § 57-14-1. 
Land is very broadly defined to mean any land within the territorial limits of the 
state of Utah. U.C.A. § 57-14-2(l)(a). Relying on the plain language of the Act 
itself, the Town owed no duty of care to keep its premises safe for the Plaintiffs 
recreational use unless the Town acted maliciously or charged the Plaintiff an 
entrance fee. U.C.A. § 57-14-3 and 4. 
The Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges that where the accident occurred 
was a "well worn side trail" to the main ATV trail. (R. pg. 30; Amended 
Complaint f7). While this fact was not accepted by the Town, it does not create a 
material issue of fact preventing summary judgment. If the fact is true, then the 
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Town is protected by the Limitation of Landowner Liabi I > tv Vet. if ilie fact is not 
Iruc, then the accident occurred on a road open for ATV use and the limitation on 
Town liability discussed below would certainly apply. 
Regardless of whether the land ^ • . K- the accident occurred is labeled a 
road, a side road, a trail, or a side trail— or it has no trail at all— it remains that the 
l.ind w ;IS u il Inn 11 ii1 lurid MM I limit1 nl the state nl I It ah . 11 u J was. under the 
allegations of Plaintiff s amended complaint, open to the ••! •?••• ' i rccr^'n Mial 
use at no charge to the public. 
III. THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLE 
REGISTRATION ACT ALSO IMMUNIZES MARYSVALE TOWN 
FROM LIABILITY FOR THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED 
DAMAGES. 
immunize i own fro ,1 ; <i i ;, ; s . •' -i.'h.-h*. 
Vehicles Act provides dial ofi-hiyhw *> vehicles max K* (Operated on pubx.c land, 
ti ails, streets or highways that are posted by sign or designated by map as open to 
off-highway vehicle use by the controlling federal., state, county, or municipal 
by any federal or state agency or any political subdivision of the state. U.C.A. § 
41-22-2(18). As was discussed above the Plaintiff was riding on an ATV when the 
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accident occurred. (R. pg. 30; Amended Complaint ^ 6). The site where the 
accident occurred was on a road owned by Marysvale. (R. pg. 56; Gary James 
Depo 5:4). Additionally, the Town road had a posted sign which allowed ATV use 
on the road. (R. pg. 56; Gary James Depo. 5:10-18). 
The Plaintiffs claims seem to hinge on the accident occurring on property 
owned by the Town but not part of a road or trail open for ATV use. The Plaintiff 
ignores what the trial court recognized. The definition of highway in the Off-
Highway Vehicle Registration Act states street or highway "means the entire width 
between boundary lines of every way or place of whatever nature, when any part of 
it is open to the use of the public for vehicular travel." U.C.A. § 41-22-2(12). It is 
undisputed that this accident took place at a cattle guard that was part of the 
Town's public road and that the fence and property was there as a means for 
people to move stock around the cattle guard. 
Because the road was public land posted by sign as open for off-highway 
vehicle use, the Town is not liable for the Plaintiffs injuries. Liability may not be 
imposed on any federal, state, county, or municipality relating to the designation or 
maintenance of any land, trail, street, or highway open for off-highway vehicle use. 
U.C.A. § 41-22-10.1(3). The purpose of the Off-Highway Vehicle Act and the 
Limitation of Landowner Liability Act taken together is to afford limitation of 
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liability to public entities which open certain designated trails, streets and 
highways for off-highway vehicle use. Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 772 
(Utal I—1} 
COINC \ v» 
I lieie mc no I;K.K HI 'lispuk1 lli.il pic\cnl Miinniniv lud^monl Ml of Ihe 
claims against Marysvale Tc~ ~ -•">'— -n-ropriately dismissed. 
Dated this da\ of ,2 >. 
I 
. I I \ ' \f 
idL. Church 
Atiorne\ for Man's\ ale iown 
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